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Each thought, each day, each life lies here as if on a laboratory table. And 
as if it were a metal from which an unknown substance is by every means to be 
extracted, it must endure experimentation to the point of exhaustion. 
 
Walter Benjamin, Moscow Diary 
 
On 4 April 1866, representatives of the Petersburg Censorial Committee 
confiscated three thousand copies of the scientific treatise, Reflexes of the 
Brain, from the Golovachev publishing house where they were awaiting 
distribution. On June 9th of the same year, the Committee issued a 
written indictment to Ivan Mikhalovich Sechenov, physiologist, professor 
at the Military Medical Academy, and author of the impounded work. 
The indictment, which accused Reflexes of the Brain of intentionally 
promoting determinism under the guise of scientific research, contains 
this scathing passage: 
 
This materialistic treatise reduces even the best men to the level of a 
simple machine devoid of consciousness and free will, and acting 
automatically; it sweeps away good and evil, moral duties, the merit of 
good deeds and the responsibility for bad ones; it undermines the 
moral foundations of society and thereby destroys the religious 
doctrine of eternal life; it mitigates against the views of Christianity and 
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the claims of the Penal Code; consequently, it leads to the corruption 
of morals.1 
 
These are hefty accusations for a work whose purpose, as Sechenov 
would later claim in his defense, was “solely to explain the action of 
external stimuli upon the nervous system.”2 Regardless of Sechenov’s 
original intentions for his work, over the year-long legal battle that 
followed its confiscation, Reflexes of the Brain only narrowly escaped a 
public trial and its author barely avoided arrest.   
While the tsarist state’s dramatic reaction to Reflexes of the Brain 
may strike a modern day reader as odd, in fact, it was emblematic of the 
centrality of science in literary and political discourses of the Russian 
1860s. The publication of Turgenev’s novel Fathers and Sons first 
introduced the character Bazarov, perhaps Russian fiction’s most 
controversial scientist, to the literary scene in 1862, only a year before 
Sechenov’s work first appeared.  Bazarov’s nihilist philosophy, grounded 
in a radically materialist view of man, indiscriminately placed both action 
and emotion in the category of mechanic physiological processes, and set 
off what historian Isaiah Berlin called “the greatest storm 
among…Russian readers of any novel, before or…since.”3  In early 1863, 
the novel What is to be Done? written by the jailed literary critic Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky, featured two similarly minded physician-scientists as 
main characters.  Both of these literary works are fascinated primarily 
with the function of the nervous system. While Bazarov’s predilection for 
catching and dissecting frogs strongly hints at his interest in neural 
pathways, Chernyshevsky is more explicit, writing that the two doctors of 
his novel “had both chosen to specialize in the nervous system.”4  
Read in this context, Sechenov’s experiments and conclusions 
provide a scientific framework for the philosophical-literary model of 
man that developed in the Russian intelligentsia from the 1860s up to and 
after the 1917 revolution.  Beginning where the censors left off, this 
paper seeks to evaluate and understand the origins, development, and 
implications of the man produced in Sechenov’s work and reproduced in 
the literature of his time. Although Sechenov’s text appears to advocate a 
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cold, mechanical, and hyper-rational vision of man, a more careful 
reading of Reflexes of the Brain destabilizes this interpretation. Sechenov’s 
mechanical man, is in fact an experimental man, likened physiologically to 
an experimental apparatus, and created and understood through 
experimental processes. Despite, or perhaps because, of his modern 
scientific origins, this “experimental man” is not rational or autonomous. 
He sweeps away distinctions between the individual and his environment 
and the real and the fictional, and implies a scope for scientific inquiry 
that is limited only by fatigue of the organic elements of the body. This 
total and unlimited vision of laboratory science is a modern literary and 
revolutionary method in itself which advocates mechanical reproduction 
as the way to produce the extraordinary and the new.  
 
Mechanical Man   
 
In Reflexes of the Brain, Sechenov essentially redefines man as a 
conducting fiber, a machine for turning environmental stimuli into 
muscular movement. “The brain is the most strange and fantastical 
machine in the world,” Sechenov writes, “a mechanism which, if brought 
into action by a certain cause, ultimately produces a series of external 
phenomena which are expressions of psychical activity.”5 In Sechenov’s 
system, every “psychical phenomenon becomes a part of a chain of 
machine like processes.”6 And it is through this seemingly fragmented 
process of step-by-step conduction that man becomes a coherent 
thinking and acting whole. “The nervous mechanisms…form, in the 
aggregate, part of the apparatus that ensures the intactness of the 
organism as a whole,” Sechenov writes.7 
The “reflexes” of the work’s title provide the mechanism by 
which sensory stimuli is transformed into physical action. “Excitation of 
the sensory nerves, excitation of the spinal center linking the sensory 
nerves with the motor nerves, and excitation of the latter, expressed 
in….muscular movement—such are the acts that comprise reflexes or 
reflex movements,” Sechenov writes.8  This process of conduction from 
sensation to action is mechanical and automatic, a relay with predictable 
results for any given stimulus. “In definite external and internal 
conditions…a given sensory stimulus will evoke a perfectly definite 
second and third element of the whole phenomenon,” Sechenov writes.9 
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In fact, Sechenov’s work was innovative and controversial not 
because of how he defined reflex movement, but rather because of the 
unprecedented scope he gave this definition. For Sechenov, all 
movement, even voluntary movement and the production of thoughts or 
emotions, fell under this heading of reflex movement. “All psychical acts 
without exception…develop by way of reflex,” Sechenov writes.10 
“Hence all conscious movements resulting from these acts and usually 
described as voluntary are reflex movements in the strict sense of the 
term.”11  Reflexes of the Brain, Sechenov proudly claimed, was the “first 
attempt to interpret the phenomena of voluntary movements as the 
machine like activity of a relatively simple mechanism.”12 
Sechenov based this extraordinary claim, that voluntary 
movements are essentially the same as involuntary ones, on a the 
phenomenon of inhibitory reflexes, which he discovered while 
conducting research with Claude Bernard in Paris a year before Reflexes of 
the Brain was published. “It appears that the brain mechanism producing 
involuntary (reflex) movements of the trunk and extremities possess two 
appendages,” Sechenov writes, “one suppresses movements, while the 
other, on the contrary, intensifies them depending on the strength of the 
stimulus.”13 This idea of inhibitory reflexes is the conceptual framework 
upon which Sechenov builds his idea of man as a totally mechanical 
creature. In this system, Sechenov defines thought and emotion as 
reflexes, albeit reflexes that do not result in movement. A thought is 
merely the absence of action in response to sensory stimuli, the “most 
important result of man’s capacity to inhibit the last member of a 
reflex.”14 Similarly, willpower, the will not to act or not to move in the 
presence of certain stimuli also traces back to inhibitory connections in 
man’s psyche. “There can be no doubt that any resistance to sensory 
stimulation is caused by mechanisms that inhibit reflex movements,” 
Sechenov asserts.15 
This theory of man as a machine gives the environment around 
him extraordinary power. If the body is properly stimulated, “movements 
are as inevitable as…the works of a machine which has been set in 
motion,” Sechenov writes.16 The only variable in this equation of 
conduction and action is the original stimulus—varying the environment 
is the only way to vary the response. “The initial cause of any human 
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activity lies outside of man,” Sechenov argues.17 “Given the same internal 
and external conditions, the activity of man will be similar,” he continues, 
“choice of one of the many possible ends of the same psychical reflex is 
absolutely impossible; its apparent possibility is merely a delusion of self 
consciousness.”18  And self consciousness itself “is also based on a more 
or less complex reflex.”19  
Reflexes of the Brain although ostensibly a work of experimental 
science, makes claims far beyond the scope of Sechenov’s laboratory 
experience. From this text, a novel vision of man as mechanism emerges, 
which subsumes all voluntary movements, thoughts and emotions under 
the rubric of external stimuli and resultant action.20 This machine is 
dynamic; Sechenov defines all bodily processes by their relationship to 
muscular action. Under Sechenov’s scheme the physical environment 
bleeds into the physiological body, comprising an important link in the 
“chain of machine-like processes”  which make up the whole.  
The revolutionary implications of this totally mechanical, 
environmentally determined, model of man were not lost on the 
Petersburg Censorial Committee. After issuing their 1866 indictment, the 
Committee quickly moved to bring Sechenov to court. Although they 
built their case on religious laws and a vague statement that Reflexes of the 
Brain was “dangerous reading material for the youth and those without 
well formed ideas,” the specific reason for the Censorial Committee’s 
meddling was obvious.21 Functioning mechanically, “even the best of 
men” was absolved of any responsibility for his actions. Materialist 
physiology could be used as a justification for anything, from common 
crime to revolutionary agitation, even for most the recent crisis—the 
student radical Dmitri Karakozov’s assassination attempt on the tsar that 
had occurred previously that spring. Ultimately, Sechenov and Reflexes of 
the Brain were called to trial precisely because the mechanical man 
produced in this work could not be.  
And yet, Sechenov’s mechanical man was doubly threatening, 
because, even though he was beyond legal investigation, he was already 
the product of an entirely different kind of investigation. “Any machine, 
no matter how intricate, can be subjected to investigation” Sechenov 
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argues.22 Man, “the most fantastical of all machines” is an ideal candidate 
for this kind of investigation, but the only proper way to conduct it is 
through laboratory science. For Sechenov, the results of this second 
investigation were already indisputable. When he first heard about the 
indictment, according to one contemporary critic, Sechenov joked, “why 
should I need a lawyer? I shall take a frog with me to court and perform 
my experiments in front of the judge.”23 This joke is an implicit threat, a 
challenge which pits two different ways of knowing against one another, 
and which reveals what was really at stake in the censorship of Reflexes of 
the Brain. Sechenov provides an alternate way of understanding and 
investigating man and his actions that does not require the intermediary 
of church or state. The particular kind of science Sechenov practiced has 
its own set of core principles and its own rubrics. How then do these 
particular principles of scientific investigation participate in the making of 
Sechenov’s mechanical man?  
 
Mechanical Objectivity   
 
In fact, by claiming that man is a machine, Sechenov confused 
what he was observing with the process of observation itself. It is not 
that man is mechanical and thus can be studied experimentally, rather it is 
the process of this experimental investigation that makes him a machine. 
This mechanized man has as his roots not so much the facts of 
Sechenov’s experimental discoveries, but the philosophy behind 
Sechenov’s scientific study. An engineer by training before entering the 
medical profession, Sechenov was fascinated at an early age by simple 
mechanical solutions to complicated problems.24 As a scientist, this 
fascination translated into an enthusiasm for laboratory apparatuses as 
objective recorders of physiological phenomena. In Reflexes of the Brain 
these laboratory machines, which are optimized to record from the 
environment around them, provide the model for man’s sensory system 
and actions. If Sechenov was, as historian David Joravsky has written, 
“the first thoroughly modern professor of physiology” in Russia, then his 
vision of man was equally modern, both understood via and constructed 
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from an amalgam of laboratory machines, which would have been 
unthinkable even a decade prior.25  
Sechenov’s enthusiasm for scientific apparatuses was certainly 
unparalleled in mid-nineteenth century Russia. In his Autobiographical 
Notes, Sechenov remarks that at the time of his training, “Moscow had 
not yet thought of a microscope,” even though microscopic analysis was 
routine in the hospitals and universities of Western Europe.26 Frustration 
with Russia’s technical backwardness drove Sechenov to study in 
Germany in the late 1850s.27 For his first independent project, a study of 
various blood gasses, Sechenov’s re-designed one of his advisor’s 
machines, and published his first paper on the success of this new 
apparatus, which was subsequently adopted by other laboratories.28 Upon 
returning to Russia, Sechenov brought with him an induction coil and a 
galvanometer, two essential pieces of equipment for the study of the 
nervous system, which, while common in Germany, had never before 
made an appearance in Russia.29 When Sechenov gave a series of 
incredibly popular lectures on “animal electricity” in 1861, these 
machines featured prominently. Historian of science Alexander Vucinich 
writes that Sechenov’s “audiences were impressed both by the ideological 
undertones of his lectures and by his skill in handling modern electrical 
apparatus while demonstrating the workings of the nervous and muscular 
systems.”30  
Sechenov’s love of mechanical systems, although novel for a 
Russian scientist, was not unique to him. In fact, the mid-nineteenth 
century was the golden age for the scientific apparatus throughout 
European laboratories. Never before or since did scientists put such faith 
in the production of scientific truth though mechanical means. Historians 
of science, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have named this turn 
towards technological solutions “mechanical objectivity.”31 Taking its cue 
from the industrialization of labor, this new scientific ethic idealized the 
machine as “a new model of perfection toward which working objects of 
science might strive.”32 The scientist himself took a backseat to this new 
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mechanical investigator, which “embodied a positive ideal of the 
observer…patient, indefatigable, ever alert, probing beyond the limits of 
the human senses.”33  
This new ideal of mechanical objectivity was especially important 
in the study of the nervous system and sensation. The establishment of a 
scientific ethic of objectivity, as Daston and Galison point out, 
“necessarily goes hand in glove with the emergence of scientific 
subjectivity.”34 And nowhere was this “enemy within” more prominent 
than in the nervous system itself, in the subjective sensory experience of 
each organism.35 In their application of mechanical objectivity to the 
study of the senses, Western neurobiologists attempted to understand 
subjectivity within an objective scientific framework. In Reflexes of the 
Brain, Sechenov takes this ethic of mechanical objectivity even further, 
redefining the sensory system itself, the seat of subjectivity, as an 
objective machine.  
In Reflexes of the Brain Sechenov likens the body to an 
experimental apparatus through his choice of analogies. “The brain…. 
produce[s] movements as inevitably as any machine,” Sechenov writes 
early in his essay, “just as, for example, the hands of a clock inevitable 
move when the clock wheels are turned by the weights”36 Thus, the body 
functions as a kind of stopwatch, as exact, dependable, and uniform as 
the clock that might be used to time a chemical reaction or the delay 
between stimulus and response. In the next few pages, Sechenov 
compares the nervous system to an electrical magnet, an apparatus which 
also appears on the list of scientific equipment that Sechenov brought 
back to Russia from Germany.37 The eye becomes a “photographic 
plate,” the experimental apparatus of mechanical objectivity par excellence, 
while “the ear perceives combinations of sounds in a concrete way and 
decomposes these combinations into separate musical tones” in the same 
way that the scientist reduces a complex physiological phenomena to its 
component parts.38 Sechenov’s mechanistic laboratory science is 
particularly modern, because it is modern experimental technology that 
provides Sechenov with both his experimental data and the analogies by 
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 A Fantastical Machine 
 
However modern and rational Sechenov’s vision of man may 
appear, it in fact gives rise to striking peculiarities. Although the external 
environment is supposed to determine the actions of Sechenov’s 
mechanical man, in fact, it is his sensory systems which determine this 
environment. In Sechenov’s work, the only definition for time and space 
is physiological. “Motion is comprised of the displacement of the body in 
space as well as of the time spent on this displacement,” Sechenov 
writes.39 The ear, “an analyzer of time,” determines the chronological 
framework in which the mechanical man lives.40 “The day lasts like a 
sound, the year lasts like a sound,” Sechenov asserts.41 Even the memory 
of space and time is just as physiologically based as their initial 
perception. “Visual and purely tactile memory can be described as 
memory of space,” Sechenov writes, “while aural and muscular memory 
can be described as memory of time”42 
In fact, the physiological body, functioning as a dependable 
scientific instrument for recording its surroundings, is the only way that 
the external environment can be known. In this way, Sechenov’s 
philosophy is not, as the tsarist state feared, one of radical exclusion, but 
rather one that is radically inclusive. Sechenov does not disprove 
everything that is immaterial, but instead raises the immaterial to the level 
of the real. Absolutely everything that the body senses must be treated as 
real, because all sensations result in reflexes with real physiological 
consequences leading to real muscular action.  Images are just as real as a 
physical touch to the body because the have the same result. “An 
involuntary start caused…by an unexpected touch on the body, or by the 
abrupt emergence of a certain image before our eyes, can be described as 
reflex movement,” Sechenov writes.43 “We experience fright at the 
unexpected touch to our trunk…as easily as we do at the unexpected 
emergence of a strange image before our eyes”44 Even intangible 
imagination must be treated as material when it provides a stimulus that 
results in real movements. In the cases of “sleeper who screams and 
moves under the influence of a terrifying dream…[or] the delirium and 
violent movements of a maniac during an attack of his disease” Sechenov 
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asserts that these are still reflex movements in response to “some kind of 
imagination, which of course, is as real as any reasonable notion.”45  
Sechenov argues that the physiological structure of the body 
itself, possesses a kind of “unconscious rationality,” like the experimental 
machine, which is a crucial but unconscious participant in the rational 
production of scientific knowledge. He begins with the example of a 
decapitated frog placed in different environments. Although it “cannot 
reason,” this frog “reacts rationally as in the case when the brain is intact, 
i.e. when it possesses will and capacity for thinking.”46 Experiments 
prove that, “the [decapitated] animal is conscious of its environment: on 
the table it creeps, in the water it swims.”47 The case is the same when 
extended to humans. Some involuntary reflex movements are so logical, 
Sechenov argues, that “to the observer the movement no longer seems 
automatic and acquires a rational character”48 In an absurd twist, 
Sechenov argues that the simple machinery of the body is sometimes 
even more rational than the mind. “Sometimes involuntary movements 
are not only equal to conscious movements in seeming rationality, but 
even surpass them in this respect,” he writes, “the apparent rationality of 
a movement…does not exclude the mechanical nature of its origin.”49 
For Sechenov, this same kind of “unconscious rationality” 
present in experimental machines and physiological bodies also exists in 
society as a whole. In the preface to Reflexes of the Brain, the only part of 
the essay in which Sechenov explicitly discusses the social and political 
context of his work, Sechenov writes about the contemporary popular 
fascination with scientific ideas. On the surface, the discussion of 
scientific ideas in non-scientific circles, and the application of scientific 
ideas outside of the laboratory appears to be “chaotic fermentation of 
unsettled thought.”50  Although “some gentlemen” fear these popular 
discussions, 
 
These gentlemen forget that there have been cases when unrestrained 
fermentation of minds eventually led to the emergence of truths. They 
should recall, for example, what mankind gained from the medieval 
thought which gave rise to alchemy. It is terrible to think what would 
have become of mankind if the rigid medieval guardians of public 
opinion had succeeded in burning and drowning as sorcerers and 
evildoers all those who worked hard at imageless ideas and who were 
unconsciously creating chemistry and medicine. People who value truth 
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in general i.e. not only present, but also future truth, will never ridicule 
any popular idea, no matter how strange this idea may seem to them.51  
 
Here, the history of science itself moves by a physiological process—
Sechenov’s “unconsciously creating” alchemists are perfect analogues to 
his vision of an unconsciously rational physiological body. But this 
paragraph also reveals another oddity. Sechenov identifies the roots of 
his modern science in the mystical, occult, and ancient practice of 
alchemy. When the tsarist censors (appearing here in a perhaps too thinly 
veiled critique as “rigid medieval guardians of public opinion”) 
impounded Reflexes of the Brain in fear of the hyper-rational modern 
automaton that it produced, they missed what was actually most absurd, 
and most radical, about Sechenov’s work.   
For it is not only scientists and sorcerers that participate in this 
unconscious creation. “Future truth” for Sechenov does not lie in the 
sterile, mechanized laboratory, but rather in society as a whole, in ideas 
which seem popular and ridiculous now, but which carry within them the 
seeds of the “chemistry and medicine” which will save mankind in the 
future. In this sense, Sechenov’s work is utopian and inclusive. Like the 
mechanical body he envisions, Sechenov’s sense of scientific truth is also 
modern, but in a different way. It is modern because it is explicitly 
oriented towards the future. For Sechenov, real scientific truth is always 
“future truth,” knowledge that appears strange now only because it is 
always a step ahead of its cultural context.  
For Sechenov, the creation of scientific truth is the job of the 
entire society, not of one individual scientist. And yet this all-inclusive 
framework has a necessary corollary: if all of society participates in the 
scientific process, then all of society becomes a laboratory. There are 
absolutely no limits to this “unrestrained fermentation” of scientific 
creation. Sechenov’s science is not only total in terms of its application to 
the body (all movement is reflex movement) and in the extent to which it 
is applied (“any machine, no matter how intricate, can be subjected to 
investigation”) but also in terms of where it is applied, and by whom. 
Scientific doctrines “creep into literature,” spark public debates, are 
“passed from hand to hand among educated society” (as the scientist Elie 
Mechnikov wrote describing Sechenov’s own essay).52 All different 
categories of actors—material and immaterial, animate and inanimate, 
fiction and machines, scientists and writers—are swept up in and united 
in this production of “imageless ideas.”  
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Sechenov’s total commitment to his experimental science is not 
without its analogues in the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia. This 
trope is often articulated as an application of European political ideas far 
beyond their logical limits, coupled with an ideal of self-sacrifice—total 
commitment, body and soul, to the revolutionary cause. Historian Isaiah 
Berlin roots this theme in the romantic idealism of the radicals of the 
1840s, with the passionate literary critic Vissarion Belinsky as its 
exemplary figure.53  However, a more striking example of this total 
revolutionary commitment lies chronologically closer to Sechenov’s own 
work.   
Published in Sovremennik just three months before Sechenov 
submitted the manuscript of Reflexes of the Brain to that same journal, 
Chernyshevsky’s radical novel What is to be Done? introduced to the 
Russian intelligentsia the character of Rakhmetov, the “extraordinary 
man.” The model of an ideal revolutionary, Rakhmetov dedicates his 
entire life to revolutionary activity, is single minded of purpose and 
action, and exhibits an iron will.  Sechenov, an acquaintance of 
Chernyshevsky’s and a habitual reader of Sovremennik, very likely read 
What is to be Done? while he was writing Reflexes of the Brain. The two 
works are remarkably similar in terms of narrative style, images, and 
themes.54 In fact, the character of Rakhmetov appears, albeit in an 
oblique fashion, in the text of Sechenov’s essay. In explaining the reflex 
origins of voluntary movements, Sechenov uses the example of “a man 
of ideally strong will…acting according to some high moral principle and 
perfectly conscious of what he does.”55 This description is a perfect 
match for Rakhmetov. Sechenov argues that even this “extraordinary 
man”, who’s movements are “voluntary in the highest degree” acts by 
mechanical reflex movements in response to external stimuli.56  
In fact, as Sechenov’s text points out, Rakhmetov is 
extraordinary because he is extraordinarily mechanical. With the rise of 
mechanical objectivity, the scientific “observer now aimed to be a 
machine,” scholars Daston and Galison write, and “this scientific self 
required restraint, a will strong enough to bridle itself.”57 Rakhmetov, the 
                                                       
53 Berlin, esp. pages 147, 171-211  
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“professional revolutionary” embodies this ideal of professional science. 
“The rigorist,” as some of the novel’s characters call him, subjugates 
everything in his life to the revolutionary cause, functioning coldly, 
rationally, and mechanically, all in the service of his revolutionary aims. 
Rakhmetov does not partake in “luxuries or whims” and makes 
acquaintances rationally, only with those people who are well connected 
and have influence over others.58 
And yet, just like Sechenov’s mechanical man, there is more to 
Rakhmetov than his coldly rational exterior suggests. As historian Claudia 
Verhoeven points out in her work The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, 
Modernity, and the Birth of Terrorism, Chernyshevsky often deliberately 
makes Rakhmetov appear ridiculous.59 Describing Rakhmetov’s type of 
“extraordinary people,” Chernyshevsky writes, “in fact, there was a great 
deal that was very amusing about them: everything of importance about 
them was amusing, everything that characterized them as a breed 
apart.”60 Rakhmetov is ridiculous, but it is precisely this ridiculousness 
that shows him to be a truly revolutionary figure. Like Sechenov’s “future 
truth” which appears strange because it is actually a step ahead of other 
modes of understanding, Rakhmetov is ridiculous because he is ahead of 
his time.   
And yet, in characterizing Rakhmetov, this most modern of 
revolutionaries, Chernyshevsky also draws deeply on far older source 
material. In their definitive edition of Chernyshevsky’s novel, Michael 
Katz and William Wagner suggest that Rakhmetov’s mannerisms may 
have been inspired by the aesthetic rituals of early Christian sects. The 
other characters in What is to be Done? often refer to Rakhmetov as 
“Nikitushka Lomov,” a reference to a popular hero from folktales.61 Just 
like Sechenov’s argument that the roots of truly modern science can be 
traced back to the ancient practice of alchemy, Chernyshevsky’s 
quintessentially modern revolutionary is in fact far closer to folkloric and 
ancient practices than any of the novel’s other characters.  
Rakhmetov’s nickname also calls up another similarity between 
Sechenov’s view of scientific process and Chernyshevsky’s 
characterization of Rakhmetov, namely that Rakhmetov, despite being an 
“extraordinary man” is also a “popular idea”, a man capable of 
representing all mankind. And this ability is inscribed in his very 
physiology. “We demand complete enjoyment of life for all people,” 
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Rakhmetov reasons, “therefore in our own lives, we must demonstrate 
that we demand this…not for ourselves alone, but for man in general.”62 
Because of this reasoning, Rakhmetov will only eat what is available for 
the common man to eat, dresses simply, and sleeps on a hard floor—all 
physiological markers that allow him to stand for the common man. 
In this way, Rakhmetov’s character is a general model, not only 
for the plight of the Russian people, but also for a particular kind of 
professional revolutionary. This model could be, and was, repeated. 
Historian Irina Paperno, in her seminal work, Chernyshevsky and the Age of 
Realism demonstrates that many real-life revolutionaries did indeed imitate 
mannerisms and habits of the fictional Rakhmetov during the 1860s.  
What is to be Done? also produced a striking number of literary parodies 
and imitations, the most famous being Dostoevsky’s Notes from 
Underground.63 In fact, the “man of ideally strong will”  in Sechenov’s own 
text may be considered one of the first Rakhmetov imitations. And yet, 
What is to be Done? is itself already an imitation of reality. In the novel, 
Chernyshevsky claims to have actually known the fictional Rakhmetov, as 
well as the other main characters. Although the real-life model for the 
“extraordinary man” is unknown, Chernyshevsky’s novel also contains a 
character who is almost a perfect match for Sechenov himself. This 
character, a young scientist named Kirsanov, spends a similar amount of 
time abroad as Sechenov, studies with the same scientists that Sechenov 
worked with in Germany and France, and becomes a professor at a 
Petersburg medical institution on exactly the same timeline as Sechenov.  
Thus, what is produced in the intersection between Sechenov’s 
scientific essay and Chernyshevsky’s novel is an odd blending of fiction 
and life, experimental science and literary technique, real people and 
“imageless ideas.” These various elements are connected by a chain of 
imitations, like the “chain of mechanical processes” that makes up 
Sechenov’s man.  This process of imitation, too, has its own roots in the 
modern ethic of laboratory science that governs Sechenov’s work. The 
true utility of an experimental apparatus lies not in its ability to produce 
faithful representations of physiological phenomena, but in its ability to 
produce the same representations every time. Thus, the rise of mechanical 
objectivity was also the rise of a new kind of scientific production based 
not on one careful observation, but on the continued reproduction of the 
same observation.  It is only through the accumulation of data points, all 
taken using the same machines with the same settings, that new scientific 
knowledge can emerge. Revolutionary experience and scientific 
experiment both mobilize reproduction in order to produce something 
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new. The goal of Chernyshevsky’s ideal revolutionary, the production of 
a new society, has to be achieved through reproduction, through the 
reproduction of reality in fiction, and then the converse: through the 
translation of these fictional types back into reality. Similarly, in order to 
produce new scientific understanding, experimental science relies on the 
mechanical reproduction of the same results over and over.  
When the Censorial Committee impounded Reflexes of the Brain in 
the spring of 1866 in conjunction with Dimity Karakozov’s attempted 
attack on the tsar, perhaps they did in fact understand its true 
revolutionary potential. This scientific production of the new through 
popular reproduction is nowhere more apparent than in the revolutionary 
philosophy of terrorism. In her book on Karakozov’s assassination 
attempt, Verhoeven writes, “the solution to the irregularity of regicide is 
to regularize it: to repeat, systematize, or scientize the singular.” And this 
mechanized “principle of repetition marks not only Karakozov’s own 
commitment….but also…his conviction that others will follow his 
example.”64 For terrorism to be effective, one single action, the 
assassination of the head of state, must be both repeatable and actually 
repeated. This process of action and imitation itself takes on the 
character of a reflex in the body politic, a stimulation transduced through 
one body to produce a response, its repetition, in the body of others. 
Sechenov’s total vision of scientific experiment is also a radical one, the 
modern mindset behind the ideal revolutionary, and his radical imitation.  
 
Experiment Without End 
 
 While the enthusiasm for natural science faded within 
revolutionary circles after the 1860s, and Sechenov never again attempted 
a project as politically controversial as Reflexes of the Brain, the fascination 
with the revolutionary potential for scientific work never quite left the 
Russian intelligentsia. In the fledgling Soviet Union of the 1920s, this 
same popular, irrational, all-inclusive, and utopian scientific ethic re-
emerged full force. Cultural historians such as Richard Stites have 
famously documented these 20th century “laboratories of revolution,” but 
few scholars have traced this radical science back to its 19th century 
roots.65 Reflexes of the Brain, and the literary-politic milieu in which it first 
appeared, reveals that the utopian science of the 1920s did not arise out 
of nothing, but rather has as its antecedent Sechenov’s peculiar kind of 
                                                       
64 Verhoeven, 148 
65 For just one example see: Richard Stites, Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision 
and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989) 
90 | Sensation(al) Science 
 
neurobiology—consciously popular, irrational, revolutionary, and total in 
its application. 
Ultimately, the only limit to this total application of experimental 
logic is an organic one—the physiological exhaustion of the body. 
Fatigue is a natural limit, the unsavory reminder that the flesh and blood 
body does not always function like a machine. Although Chernyshevsky 
writes that Rakhmetov, the ideal revolutionary, “needed no rest,” 
Sechenov was constantly troubled by the idea of fatigue.66 For Sechenov, 
fatigue was where the machine of the body broke down, where the senses 
stopped, and movement ceased. “A man in deep sleep and having no 
sensory nerves would not awaken till his death,” Sechenov writes in the 
conclusion to Reflexes of the Brain. Fatigue was death because it was the 
limit of sensation, and because it was the limit of sensation, it was also 
the ultimate limit of mechanical experimentation. At the end of his life, 
Sechenov built a variety of machines to test the impact of fatigue on the 
nervous processes. A photograph of Sechenov from this time shows him 
strapped into one of these machines, which encloses him from all sides 
and connects to each one of his appendages. This image is striking, as it 
exemplifies Sechenov’s particular kind of scientific investigation, which 
subjects everyone and everything to investigation, even the experimenter 
himself, mixing the real with the fictional, the man with the machine. 
And the search for this future truth through radical experimentation 
comes at a cost to the present. Walter Benjamin, writing about the Russia 
of the 1920s in his Moscow Diary could very well have been writing about 
Sechenov’s scientific alchemy. “Each thought, each day, each life lies here 
as if on a laboratory table,” Benjamin writes, “and as if it were a metal 
from which an unknown substance is by every means to be extracted, it 
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